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Abstract 
 
In this paper I investigate the relation between corruption and press freedom, perceived press 
freedom and the difference between press freedom and perceived press freedom as well as the 
causality of corruption on press freedom. My hypothesis is that corruption has a negative effect on 
both press freedom and perceived press freedom but that a higher level of corruption tends to make 
people believe the press is freer than it actually is. The methodological approach can be divided into 
two parts; first I run a set of cross-sectional regressions, with ethnolinguistic fractionalization as 
instrumental variable for corruption, on 29 European countries based on data from 2012, where the 
dependent variables varies between press freedom, perceived press freedom and the difference 
between press freedom and perceived press freedom; in the second part I run a panel data 
regression based on 45 European countries between 2005-2016, with press freedom as the only 
dependent variable. The results from the cross-sectional regressions suggest that corruption is 
significantly negative related to press freedom and that media concentration is significantly negative 
related to perceived press freedom. These results also suggest corruption being significantly negative 
related to the difference between press freedom and perceived press freedom, which implies that a 
higher level corruption tends to make people believe the press is freer than it actually is. The panel 
data regression however, shows that the causal effect of corruption on press freedom is negative but 
not significant. 
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Introduction 
 
In this section I motivate and give some background to the choice of subject. It also contains a short 
introduction to the methodological approach and the nature of data. 
 
On March 26, 2017, media reported of crushed demonstrations in a number of major Russian cities. 
The demonstrations sought to protest corruption in the Russian government and to put light on the 
recent downturn of several democratic rights in the Russian society, a downturn that both protestors 
and non-governmental organizations claim to have gradually worsened in the last years (Filipov, 
2017; Freedom House, 1). While the events were thoroughly covered in western media, it was barely, 
if not at all, mentioned in its Russian counterpart (Pinchuk and Shurmina, 2017). These events were 
followed up by new demonstrations in June the same year. Even this time the demonstrations sought 
to highlight the outspread and increasing corruption in the country, with the consequence of the 
arresting of more than thousand people (MacFarquhar and Nechepurenko, 2017). Just a few weeks 
after the first wave of Russian demonstrations in March 2017, Turkey held a constitutional 
referendum regarding an extension of the president’s authority of power. The result was with the 
slightest of margins in favor of a yes, although some questions arose concerning the fairness of the 
vote. Nevertheless, it has been argued that an important contribution to the victory of the Turkish 
government supported yes-side was the fact that a majority of Turkish media is controlled by the 
state or government-friendly conglomerates, while most critical news organizations and journalists 
have been shut down or persecuted (Weise).  
Russia and Turkey are two examples of countries where press freedom has declined in recent years 
and this tendency can also be seen on a more global scale. Freedom House’s report of freedom of 
the press in 2016 accounts for its lowest global point in twelve years (Freedom House, 2, 3). One 
might think that the increased suppression and censorship of media that have been reported in many 
countries would be met by disappointment and disbelief among the citizens, but in reality this has 
not always been the case. Although the obvious skewedness in Russian and Turkish mass media 
reporting for example, both governments enjoy supports from a large part of the population (Rusli, 
2017; Butler and Karadeniz, 2017 ). How is this possible? Maybe people are aware of the biasedness 
of the press but generally agree with the government anyway or maybe they do support the 
government because they believe the information provided by the press is critical and reliable.  
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According to some previous studies an outspread corruption can have negative and misleading 
effects on public media perception since it is closely linked to media concentration which in turn can 
form the public opinion to fit the interest of the big media players, not seldom with a close linkage to 
the government (McCormick, 1981; Kristof, 2014). But on the other hand, corruption is also believed 
to increase suspiciousness toward institutions etc. (Klapper, 1960; Rothestein and Uslaner, 2005). It is 
therefore of great interest to examine whether people are aware of the subsequent media 
biasedness due to corruption (if the perceived press freedom is affected), as well as how the 
perception of press freedom relates to the “real” press freedom (if people believe the press is freer 
than it actually is) and if these (hypothetical) differences can be explained by the present level of 
corruption. Due to the close linkage between corruption and media concentration it is also likely to 
assume that corruption is negatively related to press freedom. When it comes to the relation 
between corruption and press freedom the causal effect of press freedom on corruption has been 
thoroughly covered in the literature, but very few previous studies has examined the reversed 
causality, i.e. the causal effect of corruption on press freedom, and as far as I am concerned no such 
study has been conducted in a European context. This is the reason why this paper – in addition to 
the question of the relation between corruption and press freedom/perceived press freedom and the 
relation between corruption and the difference between press freedom and perceived freedom – 
also examines the relation and causal effect of corruption on press freedom.  
My hypothesis concerning press freedom and perceived press freedom is that corruption is 
negatively related to both. When it comes to the difference between press freedom and perceived 
press freedom my hypothesis is – based on the fact that a majority of the citizens in countries such as 
Turkey and Russia still put a lot of trust in their governments – that a higher level of corruption tends 
to make people believe the press is freer than it actually is. Regarding the causal effect of corruption 
on press freedom my hypothesis is the effect being negative due to the close linkage to media 
concentration. 
The research is set in a European context and as far as I am concerned, the relationship between 
corruption and press freedom/perceived press freedom has not been examined with this procedure 
in the literature so far, neither has the causality of corruption on press freedom in a European 
context. It is therefore of great interest and hopefully this paper can contribute and fill some gaps in 
the literature.  
The hardest part in the research process of this paper was to find adequate data for perceived press 
freedom. While there are several indexes that annually measure the press freedom of different 
countries, such as the Reporters without Borders’ World Press Freedom Index and the Freedom 
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House’s Freedom of the Press Index, there are no such counterparts when it comes to perceived 
press freedom. Luckily, the theme for European Social Survey Round 6 in 2012 was “Understanding 
and Evaluations of Democracy”, in which the questionnaire included questions regarding media 
perception (the European Social Survey has so far released seven reports, one each second year since 
2002, but only in 2012 were questions regarding perception of media included). This data will be the 
basis for the first of two sets of regressions. Hence the regressions investigating the relation between 
corruption and press freedom/perceived press freedom as well as the relation between corruption 
and the difference between press freedom and perceived press freedom will be based on cross-
sectional data from the 29 European countries included in European Social Survey Round 6. In the 
second data set, where I more thoroughly examine the causal effect of corruption on press freedom, 
a panel data set covering all available European countries between 2005 and 2016 is used. 
Chapter 2 covers theories and previous studies that can be related to the subject. In Chapter 3 the 
included data in my analysis is described and motivated. Chapter 4 provides a description of the 
methodology used for the two sets of regressions and it is followed by the results in Chapter 5. 
Chapter 6 gives a conclusion based on the results and the theory. References and Appendix can be 
found at the end of the paper.  
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Previous Research 
 
In this section theories from previous studies related to the subject is covered. It will later be applied 
in the conclusion in order to interpret and discuss the results from the regressions.  
 
A study by Strömberg (2015, 1) discusses how a biased mass media through propaganda can affect 
the behavior of voters. The question of mass media’s ability to “brainwash” people arose during the 
1930s, due to Hitler’s and Mussolini’s effective use of radio propaganda, and some theories claimed 
that by exploiting cognitive mistakes voters make the media can manipulate voters to act against 
their own interests. This theory, that an intended message is directly received and generally accepted 
is referred to as the hypodermic needle theory. Based on a number of empirical studies, Klapper 
(1960) made the conclusion that mass communication in the short run more frequently reinforced 
the voter’s prior views instead of changing them. However, as subsequent studies have shown, there 
are channels through which biased mass media affects people’s behavior in the long run. By setting 
an agenda the media coverage of an issue makes people believe the issue is important; through 
priming people evaluate politicians based on the issue covered in media; and through framing, which 
is the assumption that the way in which an issue is described by the media influences how it is 
understood by the audience (Strömberg, 1). Strömberg found that agenda setting and priming 
systematically hurt voters without access to media and minorities whose issues are less covered. He 
also found that media has strong negative effects when there are conflicts of interest among 
different groups in the society, which the Rwandan Genocide and the pogroms in Nazi Germany are 
examples of.  
The linkage to corruption, and a recurrent interpretation and suggestion examining the relationship 
between press freedom and corruption today, is the emergence of media concentration due to 
corruption. Media diversity and pluralism is said to be one of the main preconditions to ensure 
political and cultural pluralism as well as strengthening citizen participation in democratic decision 
making. It is also said to be one of the most important prerequisites for freedom of expression 
(Meier and Trappel, 1998). One of the main consequences of high media concentration is the 
subsequent lack of public debate on media concentration. Even if journalists have their own concerns 
they do not report them, probably due to internal pressure, and it becomes more dangerous for 
journalist to investigate corruption the more corrupt the country is (Meier and Trappel, 1998; 
Freedom House). When explaining why corruption tends to lead to media concentration, the 
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emergence of crony capitalism is often seen as the main channel (McCormick, 1981). Crony 
capitalism can be defined as an economy in which business thrive due to a connection between the 
business and political class. By using state power to crush competition through special permits, 
government grants and other forms of state intervention, one or a few actors can develop monopoly 
or oligopoly within a specific market (Kristof, 2014). In the media market, crony capitalism therefore 
in the end results in media conglomerates with journalists rarely reporting of issues not in favor of 
their clients – a consequence is that investigative journalists move to public relations and write 
“press releases” instead (Lewis, 2014). A study by Bagdikian (1990) strengthens this theory. He found 
that market dominant corporations in the mass media exert a dominant influence over public news, 
public ideas and political attitudes and also effect the audiences’ perception of public life and 
politicians.   
Brunetti and Weder (2003) examined the reversed causality, and they found that countries with a 
high level of press freedom tend to have a lower level of corruption. They suggest that an 
independent press is one of the most effective institutions in order to detect and uncover trespassing 
by government officials, since independent journalists have strong incentives to uncover misuse of 
power. The costs of corruption have also been of academic interest. The studies by Klitgaard (1987) 
and DeSoto (1988) put light on corruption as a major obstacle for developing countries, while Mauro 
(1995) found that corruption negatively affects rates of investment. Knack and Keefer (1995) show 
that corruption lower growth due to lower accumulation of resources in institutions as well as 
misallocation of resources, for example toward the media. It can be connected to a study by 
McChesney and Nichols (2010) where they found that political awareness is highly correlated with 
the amount of media subsidizes from governments.   
Chowdhury (2004) found that the voters´ state of politic knowledge is robust correlated with the 
level of corruption within a country. He suggests that the best solution to this problem is a free press 
since it affects the voters’ state of knowledge and their subsequent selection of representative 
politicians. Strömberg (2015, 2) states that media scrutiny increases the political accountability which 
in turn improves policy. In an analysis of the evolution of mass media since World War II by Starr 
(2012) the consequences of the emergence of Internet was examined. The author states that the 
digital revolution has been good for freedom of expression and information but has mixed effects on 
press freedom since it disrupted the traditional sources of funding and weakened the ability of the 
press to act as an effective agent of public accountability. 
In an American context, Snyder and Strömberg (2008) found that a poor fit between the diversity of 
media markets (in terms of newspapers) and political districts reduces the coverage of politics. In 
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other words, districts with a low diversity of newspapers tend to have a lower coverage of politics 
than the average on an aggregated level. They state that it is less likely that a congressman who is 
less covered by the media work for their constituencies, as well as standing witness before 
congressional hearings. They also found that it is less likely that inhabitants in these “poor fitted 
areas” know their candidates’ names. Kiousis (2001) examined perceptions of news credibility for 
television, newspapers and online news from a randomly selected sample of residents in Austin, 
Texas. His data showed a moderate negative linkage between interpersonal discussion of news and 
media credibility for television but not for newspapers. His main finding was that people were 
generally skeptical of news coming from all three media channels.  
In a study, also based on data from European Social Survey, Hakhverdian and Mayne (2012) 
examined the effect of education on institutional trust as a function of corruption. Although mass 
media often is seen as an institution in itself (McQuail, 2015), the definition of institutional trust is 
much broader and mass media only a confined part of it. However, they found that in countries with 
high levels of corruption education dampens institutional trust while it is boosted in countries with 
low levels of corruption. Another result from their study was that the least educated were unaffected 
by the level of corruption in their institutional trust. The relation between corruption and 
institutional trust has further been examined and this literature highlights that corruption 
undermines the institutional trust, mainly since it affects the procedural performance of the 
institutions and since corruption makes it difficult for governments to produce policies and services 
that responds to the general public (Rothestein and Uslaner, 2005).  
Media can also be censored by the state when it considers the inner and outer political surroundings 
unsecure. During World War II, the coalition government in Sweden for example had regular contacts 
with all major Swedish newspaper which were obliged to report and get their material confirmed by 
the government in order to publish. Although the Swedish people were aware of the censure, they 
still generally had the perception of a free media since they believed it was for the common good 
(Ohlsson, 2016). Such examples show that although people know that the media to some extent is 
censored they can still have the perception that it is free. 
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2.2 Summary and Applying Theories  
 
The main reason why corruption can be assumed to have a negative effect on press freedom is since 
it tends to lead to crony capitalism with subsequent media concentration, and thus a less diversified 
media landscape with a few actors in control. The studies suggesting that media concentration 
decreases democratic participation and the political state of knowledge of citizens could be an 
argument in favor of the hypodermic needle theory (that people are easy to deceive and brainwash), 
although more recent studies claim this theory to be incorrect. However, as recent studies on 
institutional trust suggest, it is likely that corruption has a negative effect on perceived press 
freedom since corruption makes it difficult to produce policies and services that responds to the 
general public. When it comes to the difference between press freedom and perceived press 
freedom and if corruption tends to make people believe the press is freer than it actually is, it is 
possible, although there is no direct effect, that the agenda, priming and framing aspects due to 
corruption have been around for so long time that the effect of corruption is negative (that is, if the 
hypodermic needle theory is not correct).    
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Data 
 
In the following section I give a short motivation to each variable as well as an explanation to where 
the data is collected from. See Appendix A for a complete list of the included countries. 
 
To study the relation between corruption and press freedom, perceived press freedom and the 
difference between press freedom and perceived press freedom, I use a cross-sectional data set. The 
research design invites to the usage of different dependent variables in order to detect changes in 
the explanatory power of the regressors. This means that I need to consider variables in the cross-
sectional analysis that not only can be assumed to affect all dependent variables, but also 
explanatory variables that are assumed to only affect one of the dependent variables. 
Unemployment, for example, can be assumed to affect perceived press freedom due to a resulting 
dissatisfaction and subsequent suspiciousness toward institutions and henceforth media, while the 
effect of unemployment on press freedom is intuitively vaguer.  
In the panel data regression, where I examine the causality of corruption on press freedom, the 
included variables are almost the same as in the cross-sectional regressions, but some variables had 
to be left out due to missing values. 
 
3.1 Dependent Variables 
 
This paper examines three different dependent variables; press freedom, perceived press freedom 
and the difference between press freedom and perceived press freedom. 
Data for press freedom is collected from Freedom House’s Freedom of the Press Index. Freedom 
House is an American non-governmental organization that conducts yearly researches on democracy, 
political freedom and human rights. They are considered an important contributor to the advocacy of 
these subjects and their data is widely used in academic researches within the field. The index 
consists of three components – legal environment, political environment and economic environment 
– where each component gives a ranking point in the related area of interest. In total the index sums 
up to a number between 0 and 100, where a low score indicates a free press and a high score 
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indicates a non-free press. To facilitate further interpretations I have inverted the scale in my data 
set, thus a high score indicates a high press freedom and vice versa. Initially my intention was to use 
the European based Reporters without Borders’ World Press Freedom Index, but since this 
measurement has changed over the years it would have complicated the interpretation of the panel 
data results. Finally, although sometimes being referred to as “press freedom in reality” in this paper, 
one should be aware of that the Freedom House index is constructed on the assessment of the 
organization and it should not be regarded as a neutral truth.  Also note that the freedom of the 
press index is based on country specific circumstances in the previous year and therefore applied in 
the regressions accordingly. For example, the freedom of the press index for 2017 is used for the 
2016 cross-section in the panel data.    
The perceived press freedom is an index I have calculated on my own, based on data from European 
Social Survey Round 6 in 2012. European Social Survey is an academically driven cross-national 
survey that every second year conducts face-to-face interviews with newly selected individuals, 
creating cross-sectional samples in every round. The survey focuses on measuring attitudes, beliefs 
and behavior patterns of diverse populations in more than thirty nations, although the countries 
included may differ between rounds (European Social Survey, 1). In accordance to similar studies 
based on data from European Social Survey (although these studies have focused on institutional 
trust) an index is calculated as the average of questions related to media perception (Hakhverdian 
and Mayne, 2012). In the questionnaire two questions regarding media perception were included, 
these questions were; “in [your] country the media are free to criticize the government” and “in 
[your] country the media provides citizens with reliable information to judge the government”.  The 
respondents were supposed to answer the questions by ranking their opinion from 0 to 10, where 0 
means that the respondent does not apply to the statement at all and 10 that the respondent applies 
completely. The index used for perceived press freedom is the average of these two questions. First 
an individual average is calculated and then a national average based on the individual data. In case 
of a missing value the respondent was removed from the data set. The research was conducted in 29 
European countries and the number of respondents in each country ranged from a minimum of 864 
in Italy to a maximum of 2782 in Germany. The average number of respondents per country was 
1694. Adjustments for regional and socioeconomics differences were incorporated in the original 
research by European Social Survey in order to reach an as country representative group as possible 
(European Social Survey, 1). However, since participation was voluntary, there is always a risk for 
selection bias.  The perceived press freedom variable is transformed to a 0-100 scale in order to 
match the Freedom House’ Freedom of the Press Index. 
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The third dependent variable, the difference between press freedom and perceived press freedom, is 
measured as the difference between the two variables described above. The difference variable, 
ranging from 0-100, is calculated accordingly: 
𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 = 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝐻𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 − 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚 
(3.1) 
The aim with this variable is to examine how well the perception of press freedom corresponds to 
press freedom in reality. More specifically I want to examine whether higher corruption tends to 
“cloak the reality”, which in this case should be indicated by corruption having a negative effect on 
the difference between the real and perceived press freedom. This measurement may not be optimal 
since the two scales are hard to compare (it is hard to say what a specific number on the press 
freedom index scale corresponds to on the perceived press freedom scale) but it may give a hint in 
which direction the effect, if any, goes. After all both scales are ordinal. 
 
3.2 Explanatory Variable 
 
Corruption is believed to have a negative relation to press freedom and perceived press freedom 
although it has also been argued that it can mislead the perception of people toward institutions and 
likewise. Data is collected from Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, which is a 
global anti-corruption coalition that annually provides country specific data on corruption. Their 
definition of corruption is “the misuse of public power for private benefit” and the index is 
determined by expert assessments and opinion survey. The index ranks countries between 0 and 
100, where a lower value indicates a higher level of corruption. Even in this case, in order to facilitate 
further interpretations, I have inverted the data in my data set, thus a lower value in the regressions 
indicates a low level of corruption and vice versa. 
 
3.2.2 Instrument to the 2SLS Estimation 
 
As instrumental variable for corruption I have chosen ethnolinguistic fractionalization. Ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization has been used as instrumental variable for corruption in previous studies (Mauro, 
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1996). I use the instrument since it is not unlikely that corruption suffers from endogeneity. 
According to the definition of an instrumental variable, ethnolinguistic fractionalization can be 
assumed to affect corruption without affecting the dependent variable except from its impact on 
corruption. Data is collected from Alesina et al’s analysis on ethnic fractionalization from 2004 which 
measures the probability that two randomly drawn individuals in a specific country are from different 
ethnic groups. The variable is time invariant and will therefore not be used in the panel regression.  
 
3.3 Control Variables 
 
The following variables are included in all regressions (unless otherwise stated), both in the panel 
and cross-sectional, as control variables. They have either been used as control variables in previous 
studies and/or can be assumed to have an impact on one of the dependent variables.  
The level of education is likely to be positively related to press freedom due to an increasing human 
capital and henceforth a developed awareness of institutions and political surroundings. It is also 
possible that it works in the other direction, that a higher press freedom leads to better institutions 
and economic development which in turn encourage education. Since education leads to an 
improved human capital it is also likely to be negatively related to the perceived press freedom the 
higher the level of corruption in a country is.  Data for education is collected from United Nation’s 
Human Development Index, which measures the average and expected years of schooling. The latest 
report was from the Human Development Report in 2014, and I will therefore use the education 
index of 2014 for the missing values in 2015 and 2016 in the panel regression.  
As mentioned previously unemployment is included since it is likely to affect perceived press freedom 
negative due to a resulting dissatisfaction and subsequent suspiciousness toward institutions and 
henceforth media. It can also be an indication on how well the economy is going, which is an effect I 
also control in GDP per capita. Data for unemployment is collected from the World Bank. 
GDP per capita is included since a higher standard of living often is likely to be followed by a higher 
level of general satisfaction as well as a more developed human capital. It is therefore assumed to 
affect both press freedom and perceived press freedom positive. Data for GDP per capita is collected 
from the World Bank and is PPP adjusted in 2010 prices. 
The variable suffrage is a dummy variable that shows whether the specific country has conducted 
democratic election on permanent basis without interruptions since 1960 (0 if the country has, 1 if it 
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has not). Democratic election is defined as elections with universal suffrage. It is likely that the longer 
the history of a democratic system within a country is, the more diversified is the media.       
 
3.3.2 Additional Control Variable for Perceived Press Freedom 
 
Media concentration will only be included as a control variable in the regression with perceived press 
freedom as dependent variable. This is because the data is collected from the Freedom House’s 
Freedom of the Press Index and therefore a part of the index itself and hence a part of the two other 
dependent variables as well. Of the three components assembling the Freedom of the Press Index, 
media concentration is interpreted as the same as the economic environment component. The 
variable measures the diversity of the media and the possibility for new media to establish. It ranks 
countries on a scale 0-30, where a higher score indicates a higher media concentration (worse 
economic environment). A high media concentration is likely to have a negative effect on the 
perceived press freedom. 
 
3.4 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Below are two box-plots depicting the yearly development and distribution of the Freedom of the 
Press Index and the Corruption Perception Index for the included countries in the panel regression. 
The figures show that both indexes have declined in recent years.  
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To see whether the theory, that a high media concentration is closely linked to corruption, can be 
applied to my data I run a correlation plot with a fitted line.    
 
Figure 3.3 suggests that the theory can be applied to my data since there is a strong positive 
relationship (although the numbers of observations are relatively small). The correlation between 
media concentration and corruption is 0.8621. For a complete correlation matrix of all the included 
variables, see Appendix B.  
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Methodology 
 
In total the data consists of two data sets, both with different properties and I will accordingly use 
different approaches for them. In the first set of regressions, based on cross sectional data, an 
instrumental variable approach is applied. The second regression, based on panel data, is estimated 
by a panel regression.  
 
4.1 Cross Sectional Regression – an IV-Approach 
 
When I examine the relation between corruption and press freedom, perceived press freedom and 
the difference between press freedom and perceived press freedom, a cross sectional data from 
European Social Survey Round 6 in 2012 is used as basis, which contains 29 observations. Since the 
data set is rather small and there is a risk for endogeneity in the corruption variable an IV-approach 
will be applied (if possible). In total three regressions will be conducted on the cross sectional data 
set, one for each one of the three dependent variables mentioned above. In each of the three 
regressions one ordinary OLS regression and one 2SLS regression will be run and then compared with 
a Hausman test for exogeneity, where the null hypothesis is that the explanatory variables are 
exogenous, hence a p-value above 5 percent indicates exogeneity in the covariates.       
 
4.1.2 Instrumental Variable Approach 
 
An instrumental variable approach, or a two stage least square (2SLS), can be applied to overcome 
problems with measurement errors and omitted variables and it is used when the correlation 
between one explanatory variable and the dependent variable can be assumed to not reasonably 
reflect the causal relationship between the two. It should be applied when the data is assumed to 
exhibit a covariance that not equals zero between one of the covariates and the error term, and 
when the error term conditional on the covariates is assumed to not equal zero as well (Dougherty, 
2011). 
When to use IV-estimate: 
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𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑥𝑖, 𝑢𝑖) ≠ 0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐸{𝑢|𝑋} ≠ 0 
(4.1) 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 +  ∑ 𝛽𝑖 ∗
𝑖=2
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝑢 
(4.2) 
Where the endogenous variables is correlated with the error term u. 
Essentially an IV-approach allows for consistent estimation and it semi replaces a defective 
explanatory variable with one that is not correlated with the error term. A defective variable is a 
covariate that is correlated with the error term and it is therefore referred to as an endogenous 
variable. A good instrument is a variable that induces changes in the endogenous variable without 
affecting the dependent variable except through its impact on the explanatory variable (Dougherty, 
2011). In other words the covariance between the instrument (denoted z) and the endogenous 
variable cannot equal zero while the expected value of the instrument conditional on the error term 
must equal zero. These properties are referred to as the first stage and the exclusion restriction. The 
first stage can be tested while the exclusion restriction has to be assumed (Verbeek, 2012). 
First stage: 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑧𝑖 , 𝑥𝑖) ≠ 0 
(4.3) 
Exclusion restriction: 
𝐸{𝑧𝑖|𝑢𝑖} = 0 
(4.4) 
An initial regression on the endogenous variable with the other covariates including the instrument 
has to be conducted to determine whether the first stage is significant. This OLS regression shows if 
the chosen instrument actually has a significant effect on the assumed endogenous variable. 
Test the first stage by OLS: 
𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 = 𝑆0 + 𝑆1 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 +  ∑ 𝑆𝑖 ∗
𝑖=2
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝜖 
(4.5) 
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If the instrument is significant the estimated parameters from regression 4.5 (denoted Si) is used to 
formulate predictions on the endogenous variable, which is then inserted into the second stage 
regression accordingly: 
𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒̂ = 𝑆0̂ + 𝑆1̂ ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 +  ∑ 𝑆?̂? ∗
𝑖=2
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 
(4.6) 
Run second stage by OLS: 
𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑢𝑠 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒̂ +  ∑ 𝛽𝑖 ∗
𝑖=2
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 + 𝑢 
(4.7) 
Note that the second stage regression 4.7 is similar to equation 4.2, with the exception that the 
endogenous variable now is predicted by the instrument (Verbeek, 2012).   
 
4.1.3 Apply Instrumental Variable Approach to My Data 
 
First I need to check whether the instrument, ethnolinguistic fractionalization, is significant to the 
endogenous variable, corruption. To test for this I run a simple OLS regression on the first stage 
according to equation 4.5, with corruption as the dependent variable. Robust standard errors are 
used in all regressions.  
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Table 4.1 - Testing First Stage with Corruption as Dependent Variable 
 
 Press Freedom and the 
Difference 
Perceived Press Freedom 
Ethnolinguistic fractionalization 4.204 (2.1446) 
p = 0.0634 . 
3.147 (1.757) 
p = 0.0884 . 
Intercept 292.9 (36.63) 
p = 0.000 *** 
105.3 (47.40) 
p = 0.0381 * 
Education -0.2900 (0.4569) 
p = 0.5325 
-0.0037 (3.755) 
p = 0.9888 
Suffrage 12.07 (5.7086) 
p = 0.0467 * 
10.98 (3.7452) 
p = 0.0083 ** 
Unemployment -0.4300 (0.4638) 
p = 0.3645 
-0.0520 (4.1755) 
p = 0.8760 
ln GDP per capita -21.03 (5.5952) 
p = 0.0012 ** 
-9.3847 (0.0360) 
p = 0.0360 * 
Media Concentration - 1.7005 (0.2830) 
p = 0.000 *** 
 Properties 
R-square 0.8372 0.9095 
P-value 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
 
Note that media concentration is not included in the regressions on press freedom and in the 
regression on the difference between press freedom and perceived press freedom, since the variable 
is a part of the press freedom variable itself.  
According to the results from the first stage regressions presented in table 4.1, ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization is significant as instrumental variable on a ten percent level in both regressions.  
 
4.1.4 Summary of the Cross Sectional Data Approach    
 
In total I run three regressions on three different dependent variables and examine the corruption 
variable. The three dependent variables are, as mentioned earlier, press freedom, perceived press 
freedom and the difference between press freedom and perceived press freedom. For each 
dependent variable one simple OLS regression and one 2SLS regression is run, with ethnolinguistic 
fractionalization as instrument for corruption. To determine which one of the OLS and 2SLS 
regression that best fits the data a Hausman test for exogeneity in the covariates is conducted.  
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An implication when comparing a 2SLS regression with an OLS regression and working with cross-
sectional data is the risk for reversed causality in the OLS regression. While the 2SLS regression gives 
us the causal effect of corruption on the dependent variables, the OLS regression only provides the 
correlation estimate between corruption and the dependent variables, not in which direction the 
causality works.  
 
4.2 Panel Data Regression 
 
The second regression is based on panel data and it examines the causality of corruption on press 
freedom. Data is collected from 45 European countries between 2005 and 2016, a total of 540 
observations. Initially all European countries as of 2017 were included but some had to be dropped 
due to missing values. Those countries were Andorra, Liechtenstein, Kosovo, Monaco, San Marino 
and the Vatican City. All those countries, except Kosovo which is the youngest country on the 
continent and therefore lacks data, are considered European microstates. Note that Israel  is 
included, although not generally seen as a part of Europe, since it was part of the European Social 
Survey Round 6 and hence incorporated in the cross sectional analysis. 
 
4.2.1 Modeling the Panel Regression 
 
In the panel data regression Freedom House’s press freedom index is the only dependent variable. To 
determine which one of the pooled, random effects and fixed effects models that best fits the data I 
need to compare them.  The pooled estimation is just an ordinary OLS estimation.  In the random 
effects model the individual specific components 𝛼𝑖 in the error term are random, independently and 
identically distributed over all individuals. The error term can be described as 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡. In the fixed 
effects model on the other hand, the individual 𝛼𝑖 components in the error term are not random and 
thus correlated with the independent variables – the same interpretation is valid for the time specific 
𝛼𝑡 components in the error term. In other words, the fixed effects model captures all the 
unobservable time-invariant differences across individuals (Verbeek). First I compare the pooled 
model with the random effects model by conducting an LM-test, followed by the same procedure for 
the pooled model versus the fixed effects model. A low p-value in the LM-test suggests that the 
random and fixed effects models are preferred over the pooled model. Finally, to determine which 
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one of the random and fixed effects models to use, a Hausman test is conducted. A low p-value in the 
Hausman test suggests that the fixed effects model is preferred over the random effects model. See 
Appendix D for a more thoroughly overview of the panel regressions and the related tests. Note that 
the time invariant parameters, the intercept and the suffrage variable, disappear due to within 
estimation in the fixed effect regressions.  
The results suggest that the fixed effects model is best fitted for my panel data. It is conducted 
accordingly: 
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡
𝑖=2
 
(4.8) 
Where αi,t represents the individual and time fixed effects.  
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Results 
 
In the following section the results from the regressions are presented.  First out are the cross-
sectional regressions where the dependent variable varies between press freedom, perceived press 
freedom and the difference between press freedom and perceived press freedom. It is followed by the 
panel data regression with only press freedom as dependent variable.    
 
5.1 Cross Sectional Regression 
 
The cross sectional analysis was conducted on 29 European countries based on data from 2012. 
Media concentration is only included in the regressions on perceived press freedom since it is a part 
of the measurement for press freedom and hence included in the dependent variable in the other 
two regressions. 
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5.1.2 Press Freedom 
 
Table 5.1 – Cross-Sectional Regression with Press Freedom as Dependent Variable 
 
 OLS IV-estimate 
Corruption -0.9947 (0.3810) 
p = 0.0217 * 
-0.4871 (0.7202) 
p = 0.5062 
Intercept 89.20 (138.6) 
p = 0.5267 
-45.52 (234.5) 
p = 0.8479 
Education 0.3712 (0.4041) 
p = 0.3687 
0.4138 (0.4485) 
p = 0.4669 
Suffrage 8.510 (3.941) 
p = 0.0425 * 
2.298 (10.43) 
p = 0.8278 
Unemployment 0.3720 (0.4221) 
p = 0.3881 
0.5737 (0.6782) 
p = 0.4071 
GDP per capita (ln) -1.7952 (14.52) 
p = 0.9028 
9.448 (21.77) 
p = 0.6688 
 Properties 
R-square 0.7915 0.7439 
P-value 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
Hausman test (exogeneity) 0.8238 
 
In relation to press freedom the corruption variable has a significant negative effect in the OLS 
regression, although the IV-estimate is insignificant. The Hausman test for exogeneity suggests the 
data is exogenous and that the OLS regression is preferred. The interpretation is that a higher level of 
corruption is negatively related to press freedom. Among the control variables, suffrage is 
significantly positive related to press freedom, which is surprising since it implies that the dummy for 
countries with universal suffrage after 1960 relates positively to press freedom. 
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5.1.3 Perceived Press Freedom 
 
Table 5.2 – Cross-Sectional Regression with Perceived Press Freedom as Dependent Variable 
 
 OLS IV-estimate 
Corruption -0.1286 (0.1217) 
P = 0.3034 
-0.2723 (0.5513) 
P = 0.6268  
Intercept 108.7 (36.01) 
P = 0.0068 ** 
126.2 (65.67) 
P = 0.0690 . 
Education -0.2387 (0.2879) 
P = 0.4169 
-0.2166 (0.3200) 
P = 0.5063 
Suffrage -3.9475 (3.0451) 
P = 0.2096 
-2.216 (7.7019) 
P =0.7765 
Unemployment -0.2802 (0.1976) 
P = 0.1707 
-0.2872 (0.2082) 
P = 0.1831 
GDP per capita (ln) -0.5248 (2.4604) 
P = 0.8333 
-2.179 (6.1579) 
P = 0.7272 
Media Concentration -1.0028 (0.2566) 
P = 0.0009 *** 
-0.7481 (0.9944) 
P = 0.4606 
 Properties 
R-square 0.8218 0.8129 
P-value 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
Hausman test (exogeneity) 0.9536 
 
When it comes to perceived press freedom the corruption variable is negatively related in both 
regressions, although not significant.  However, in the OLS regression, media concentration is 
negatively related to perceived press freedom on a three star level of significance. The Hausman test 
for exogeneity suggests that the data is exogenous and that the OLS regression is preferred. The 
interpretation is that a higher level of media concentration tends to relate negatively to perceived 
press freedom. If I remove the media concentration variable it turns out that the corruption variable 
becomes significantly negative related to perceived press freedom instead (see Appendix C). This is 
an interesting finding since it indicates that the effect of corruption on perceived press freedom (due 
to the high correlation between corruption and media concentration) is mainly channeled through 
media concentration.  
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5.1.4 The Difference Between Press Freedom and Perceived Press 
Freedom 
 
Table 5.3 – Cross-Sectional Regression with the Difference as Dependent Variable 
 
 OLS IV-estimate 
Corruption -0.5645 (0.2601) 
P = 0.0416 * 
-0.1042 (0.9083) 
P = 0.9097  
Intercept 4.031 (94.48) 
P = 0.9664 
-131.5 (274.2) 
P = 0.6365 
Education 0.4936 (0.3330) 
P = 0.1531 
0.5365 (0.4824) 
P = 0.2786 
Suffrage 9.909 (4.100) 
0.0248 
3.660 (13.88) 
P = 0.7946 
Unemployment 0.5392 (0.3322) 
P = 0.1194 
0.7422 (0.6368) 
P = 0.2569 
GDP per capita (ln) -2.4796 (9.867) -0.1043 (0.9083) 
P = 0.9097 
 Properties 
R-square 0.5819 0.4628 
P-value 0.0016 ** 0.0281 
Hausman test (exogeneity) 0.7941 
 
In the last group of the cross-sectional regressions, with the difference between press freedom and 
perceived press freedom as dependent variable, the corruption variable is significantly negative 
related to the dependent variable in the OLS regressions, while the relation is not significant in the 
IV-regression. The Hausman test for exogeneity suggests that the OLS regression is the more 
trustworthy of the two. The interpretation is that a higher level of corruption tends to make people 
believe the press freedom is freer than in actually is, since corruption has a significant negative effect 
on the difference.  
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5.2 Panel Data Regression 
 
The panel regression analysis is conducted on 45 European countries between 2005 and 2016, which 
sum up to a total of 540 observations. In Appendix D, the results from the pooled and random 
regressions are included as well. On this data, LM- and Hausman-tests were conducted in order to 
determine which of the models to use. The tests suggested that the fixed effect model was the best 
estimation method and that is why I have chosen to only present this regression below. All 
regressions are adjusted with robust standard errors.  
 
Table 5.4 – Panel Regressions with Fixed Effect (Individual and Time) 
 
Corruption -0.0227 (0.0384) 
p = 0.5542 
Intercept - 
Education -0.2901 (0.1116) 
p = 0.0096** 
Suffrage - 
Unemployment -0.0626 (0.0739) 
p = 0.3973 
GDP per capita (ln) 5.242 (2.760) 
p = 0.0581 . 
Properties 
 
R-square 0.0407 
P-value 0.0005*** 
Multicollinearity Yes 
 
 
As with the cross-sectional regressions, the panel regression is significant on a three star level. The 
intercept and the suffrage variable disappear due to that the fixed effect is based on within 
estimation and henceforth variables with time-invariant and constant properties equal zero. The 
within estimation is also the reason why the R-square value might seem to be suspiciously low, since 
it removes both the individual and time effect. Corruption has a negative causality in the regression, 
although not significant. It means that a higher corruption cannot be said to significantly lead to a 
lower press freedom. Regarding the control variables, a higher education has, surprisingly, a 
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significant negative effect on press freedom. The table also shows that GDP per capita has a positive 
effect on press freedom on a ten percent level of significance.   
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Conclusion 
 
The results strengthen the theory that corruption is negatively related to both press freedom and 
perceived press freedom. The high correlation between corruption and media concentration also 
makes it clear that the linkage to media concentration is one of the main channels from which 
corruption affects press freedom. The negative effect of media concentration (and corruption) on 
perceived press freedom is in accordance with previous researches on institutional trust, that a 
higher corruption is reflected by public disbelief toward institutions such as the mass media. It also 
works as critique to the hypodermic needle theory – people in general are aware of media 
biasedness (if present) and they are not easy deceived. However, as the results from the regression 
on the difference between press freedom and perceived press freedom suggests, corruption can be 
interpreted to make people believe the press is freer than it actually is. This is an interesting finding 
and if the available data on perceived press freedom should extend in the future I recommend 
further research on this subject.  
In terms of causality, the result from the panel regression suggests that the effect of corruption on 
press freedom is negative but not significant. This finding was somewhat surprising, but it might be 
due to that it takes time for media concentration to occur and that the effect of corruption can be 
seen first after some years. This is also a subject I recommend further research on. 
Finally, to answer the question addressed in the introduction, whether a majority of the people in 
Russia and Turkey are aware of the mass media biasedness but support the governments anyway or 
if they believe the mass media is critical and reliable and thereby support the government, the 
answer, based on the discussion and findings in this paper, is probably the first statement of the two. 
It is likely that people are aware of the biasedness, as the perceived press freedom for Russia also 
suggests (there is no such data for Turkey), but due to the fact that both countries have suffered 
from corruption for a long time it is also likely that the agenda, priming and framing aspects over the 
years have shaped a public cognitive mind in favor of the governments.   
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Appendix 
 
A 
Included Countries 
Cross-Sectional Data Panel Data 
   
Albania Albania Montenegro 
Belgium Armenia Netherlands 
Bulgaria Austria Norway 
Cyprus Azerbaijan Poland 
Czech Republic Belarus Portugal 
Denmark Belgium Romania 
Estonia Bosnia & Hercegovina Russia 
Finland Bulgaria Serbia 
France Croatia Slovakia 
Germany Cyprus Slovenia 
Hungary Czech Republic Spain 
Italy Denmark Sweden 
Ireland Estonia Switzerland 
Israel Finland Turkey 
Iceland France Ukraine 
Kosovo Georgia United Kingdom 
Lithuania Germany  
Netherlands Greece  
Norway Hungary  
Poland Iceland  
Portugal Ireland  
Russia Israel  
Sweden Italy  
Slovenia Latvia  
Slovakia Lithuania  
Spain Luxembourg  
Switzerland Macedonia  
United Kingdom Malta  
Ukraine Moldova  
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B  
Correlation Matrices 
Correlation Matrix – Cross-Sectional Regressions 
 
 Corr. Unem. Educ. Suff. M.C lnE lnGDP 
Corruption - 0.3980 -0.6083 0.7291 0.8621 0.3979 -0.8410 
Unemployment 0.3980 - -0.5979 0.4649 0.2755 0.0518 -0.5284 
Education -0.6083 -0.5979 - -0.4478 -0.6140 -0.0563 0.7311 
Suffrage 0.7291 0.4649 -0.4478 - 0.5628 0.3923 -0.7367 
Media 
Concentration 
0.8621 0.2755 -0.6140 0.5628 - 0.3206 -0.7802 
ln Ethno 0.3979 0.0518 -0.0563 0.3923 0.3206 - -0.3270 
ln GDP capita -0.8410 -0.5284 0.7311 -0.7367 -0.7802 -0.3270 - 
 
 
Correlation Matrix – Panel Data Regression 
 
 Corruption Unemployment Education Suffrage ln GDP capita 
Corruption - 0.3838 -0.6131 0.6423 0.8240 
Unemployment 0.3838 - -0.4423 0.3045 04423 
Education -0.6131 -0.4423 - -0.3440 0.6438 
Suffrage 0.6423 0.3045 -0.3440 - -0.6447 
ln GDP capita 0.8240 -04423 0.6438 -0.6447 - 
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C 
Cross-Sectional Regression on Perceived Press Freedom (No Media Concentration)  
Table Appendix C – Cross-Sectional Regression with Perceived Press Freedom as Dependent 
Variable (No Media Concentration) 
 
 OLS IV-estimate 
Corruption -0.3802 (0.1617) 
p = 0.0285 * 
 -0.3828 (0.3611) 
p = 0.3010 
Intercept 85.16 (59.58) 
p = 0.1676 
85.97 (102.4) 
p = 0.4105 
Education -0.1225 (0.3175) 
p = 0.7036 
-0.1227 (0.3139) 
p = 0.6996 
Suffrage -1.399 (3.1831) 
p = 0.6650 
-1.3660 (6.0122) 
p = 0.8230 
Unemployment -0.1672 (0.2400) 
p = 0.4936 
-0.1684 (0.2595) 
p = 0.5233 
GDP per capita (ln) 0.6844 (5.552) 
p = 0.9031 
0.6176 (9.184) 
p = 0.9470 
Media Concentration -  
 Properties 
R-square 0.791 0.7809 
P-value 0.000 *** 0.000 *** 
Hausman test (exogeneity) 0.9536 
 
 
  
 
 
36 
 
D  
Panel Regression 
Table Appendix D – Panel Regression 
 
 Pooled 
 
Fixed Random 
Corruption -0.6531 (0.041) 
p=0.000*** 
 
-0.0227 (0.0384) 
p = 0.5542 
-0.0766 (0.0411) 
p = 0.0630 .  
Intercept 2.0968 (15.64) 
p=0.8934 
 
- 102.4 (22.23) 
p=0.000*** 
Education 0.3028 (0.0858) 
p=0.000*** 
 
-0.2901 (0.1116) 
p=0.0096** 
-0.4142 (0.1042) 
p=0.000*** 
Suffrage 0.5648 (1.311) 
p = 0.6667 
 
- -20.42 (3.667) 
p=0.000*** 
Unemployment 0.6332 (0.0851) 
p=0.000*** 
 
-0.0626 (0.0739) 
p=0.3973 
-0.1382 (0.0715) 
p=0.0539 
GDP per capita (ln) 6.3393 (1.432) 
p=0.000*** 
5.242 (2.760) 
p = 0.0581 . 
1.179 (2.275) 
p=0.6047 
  
Properties 
 
R-square 0.7191 
 
0.0407 0.1273 
P-value 0.000*** 
 
0.0005*** 0.000*** 
LM test pooled vs 
random 
0.000*** 
 
- 0.000*** 
LM test pooled vs fixed 0.000*** 0.0000*** - 
Hausman test fixed vs 
random 
- 0.0165* 0.0165* 
 
